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and also as a means to some other end, and hence demand that "true love shall be rewarded," are reasoners in a circle; they would justify other goods as leading to the final goal of love, and yet would insist that this final goal should itself be made a direction-post to the lesser goods along the way. As I have said, Hardy himself in his rebellious moments does not always avoid this perilous path of ill logic, but the inner truth of his work surely refutes his own pessimism, and shows us an optimism that may be ours—if in heroism we will rise unto it!

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THE TYRANT OF THE MIND.

"False in thy glass all objects are,
Some sett too near, and some too far:
Thou art the fire of endless night,
The fire that burns, and gives no light,
All torments of the damn'd we find
In only thee,
O Jealousie!
Thou tyrant, tyrant of the mind."

—*Dryden.*

At an ante-prandial gathering in a drawing-room there entered mine host's two little daughters and two pet dogs. The master happening to single out one of the latter for caresses, the other by surly looks and growls displayed poignant jealousy. The attitude of host and guests was not merely one of amusement; they appeared even to accord the animal a certain respect for what they regarded a distinctly human quality. When, however, a guest presented to one of the little girls a new toy and her sister in an infantile thunder-cloud of screams and tears exactly paralleled the jealous dog, mine host and his good wife were greatly chagrined. Their daughter's "humanness" was viewed as lamentable precocity of human vice. As a matter of fact, the judges had been overgenerous to the dog and unjust to the

girl. Both animal and child had merely acted out an organic trait of their beings.

In Bacon's essay on "Envy" there is considerable shrewd observation of the manifestations and effects of that passion, but no scientific inquiry into its origin is attempted. Bacon, indeed, seems not entirely incredulous of certain superstitious notions entertained in his day concerning a connection between envy and the "evil eye."

Montaigne refers to jealousy only incidentally and merely in connection with its single phase of sexual jealousy. Burton, in the "Anatomy of Melancholy," has much more to say on the subject which characteristically, however, consists largely of a collation of illustrative anecdotes and quotations. What little philosophizing he does attempt, as with Montaigne, turns largely on the sexual motive. More surprising than inadequate treatment by moralizers of the old school is the fact that Herbert Spencer's elaborate work on Ethics contains no analysis or direct consideration of jealousy or envy, though he does discuss most of the virtues and vices. A treatise on Evolutionary Ethics is of all places the one in which the recognition of jealousy as a serious factor would naturally be expected. The very simple explanation of the prevalence of jealousy is that it is an inevitable concomitant of the evolution of such forms of life as are capable of thought and emotion. Betterment in living, whether material, mental or social, is the fruit of competition and represents the triumph of the fittest. In the stress over the most important thing in the creature's life emotion is stimulated and the striver tends to hate rather than love his rivals. The higher forms of animal life are heirs not only of generations of struggle but of generations of its emotional concomitant. It is only natural that the young child, like the young animal, should manifest jealousy as early as it is capable of the most rudimentary thought. While a definite and frank manifestation of jealousy in a person of mature years, or even in a child, causes something of a shock and excites reprobation, the general phenomenon of jealousy is reckoned with in practice, almost as universally as the converse law that love engenders favorable prejudice.

The generation of the sentiment of jealousy, indeed its deliberate fostering up to a certain point, enters integrally into the scheme of evolutionary morals. Probably the most important and significant generalization of Herbert Spencer on Ethics, is that social as well as personal well-being must result from a harmonious adjustment between egoism and altruism, that excess of either is equally detrimental to general progress and individual happiness. In insisting upon the necessary or just rights of self, jealousy of others who encroach upon them is legitimate. An illustration of wide scope is furnished by the international principle of balance of power. "One power cannot extend its territory, or increase its strength, or largely add to its resources, without giving umbrage to neighboring powers. If its growth assumes alarming proportions, the spur of interest suffices to induce other nations to unite, in order to oppose its impending domination over them. This very simple fact, which has appeared at all times and in all places, was the first germ of the theory of the balance of power." Useful and beneficent as this theory in the main has been, "it may be easily perverted if, by deviating from the limits of right, it serves as a pretext and an instrument of every kind of jealousy and political greed; if it is directed to invasion in common, to partition of foreign territory, agreed upon between several; to the subjection of the weak; to the league of the strong; to opposition to legitimate acts of the various national sovereignties; and to repression of the essential rights which belong to each nation." In the internal affairs of a nation, the jealousies of parties and factions moderately indulged, have an analogous justification and utility. A strong opposition is always desirable as a check upon excesses of the dominant party and a minority is rightfully jealous of the power of the majority that ever tends to pass into tyranny. But the jealousy of domestic factions is even more prone than that of nations "by deviating from the limits of right" to promote purely selfish advantage and unpatriotic abuses. It has not been uncommon under present forms of government for one party to checkmate measures of unquestionable public benefit so

that their opponents might not have the political credit of passing them. English history presents many instances of the vicious effects of factional jealousy but none more momentous and far-reaching than the enforced celibacy of Queen Elizabeth. In the language of Mr. J. R. Green, "whatever womanly tenderness she had, wrapped itself around Leicester; but a marriage with Leicester was impossible; and every other union, could she even have been bent to one, was denied to her by the political difficulties of her position." It would, of course, be idle to speculate in detail as to what English politics and life would have been during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries if Elizabeth could have married and borne an heir to the throne, and the long incubus of the Stuart kings and Stuart Pretenders had been avoided. But it is at least safe to assume that the development toward liberal institutions would have been easier and smoother and much bloodshed and misery would have been spared.

It may be conceded that in the attitude of the individual towards public affairs and in his social and family relations, a certain amount of jealousy is legitimate, but the egoistic principle as a rule gains undue ascendancy, warping the reason and souring the heart. Extended illustration of the subversion of the patriotic spirit by overgrown self-love, is, of course, unnecessary. How large a part of the history of universal politics is a narrative of machination for personal aggrandizement! It may be of interest to recall a single modern instance in our country—the jealous attitude manifested by Salmon P. Chase while a member of Lincoln's cabinet. Intelligent men of the present day readily sympathize with the dismay of the trained Northern statesmen upon first encountering the man of imperfect education, slender public experience, uncouth exterior, and unpolished language. Among the highest claims of William H. Seward to fame and lasting gratitude is the fact that he promptly realized that he had come in contact with a great natural genius and that thenceforth appreciation and cordial coöperation never halted. The record of Chase's great public services, on the

other hand, is seriously sullied by envious personal aspiration that prevented him from taking anything approaching Lincoln's just measure. Chase's sparsely disguised contempt for his chief, his attitude of personal disloyalty finally passing into actual intrigue for the presidential succession, severely taxed even Lincoln's wonderful magnanimity and materially impaired his own usefulness.

In the parental-filial relation the element of competition is commonly absent; indeed there is usually community, if not identity, of interest. But wherever rivalry does arise between a parent and child, we may look for its ordinary emotional concomitant, sickly over or absolutely extinguishing "natural love and affection." The garrulous and pedantic Anatomist of Melancholy remarks that "the jealousy of some fathers is very eminent to their sons and heirs; for though they love them dearly, being children, yet now coming towards man's estate they may not well abide them; the son and heir is commonly sick of the father, and the father again may not brook his eldest son, *inde simulates, plerumque contentiones et inimicitiae*. . . . How jealous was our Henry the Fourth of King Richard the Second, so long as he lived, after he was deposed? and of his own son Henry in his latter days? which the prince well perceiving, came to visit his father in his sickness in a watchet velvet gown, full of eyelet holes, and with needles sticking in them (as an emblem of jealousy), and so pacified his suspicious father, after some speeches and protestations, which he had used to that purpose."

As to jealousy between brothers and sisters and friend and friend, there is a world of significance in the saying of Rochefoucault: "In our friends' misfortunes there is something secretly pleasant to us." This attitude of mind is founded not at all upon resentment of injustice to ourselves, but it involves injustice to others. The great instinct of competition has bred a propensity, in proportion as one covets success, to hate those who succeed better and to rejoice in their calamity, if eventually they fall. It is interesting that this element supplies the first touch of genuine

human nature in the Hebrew Scriptures: "And the Lord had respect unto Abel, and to his offering; but unto Cain, and to his offering he had not respect: and Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell." The Cain and Abel legend has been practically paralleled in countless instances in all phases of life. Nowhere has inter-fraternal jealousy been more marked than under democratic institutions where brothers and sisters start with equal artificial opportunity and one outstrips the other either because of superior talent or better luck.

In democracies social standing roughly indicates and measures general success in life, and is the object of a stress of competition in which the number of rivals is limited only by the broadest lines of class. Marriages between children of men who had the luck to "strike pay gravel in drifting on Poverty Flat," and descendants of members of the Order of Cincinnati have become too common to excite serious comment. The daughter of an American shopkeeper is the wife of the Viceroy of India. Whether we consider the strife of millionaire hostesses to entertain an emperor's brother, or a lesser nobleman, on his travels, or the pitifully petty bickerings of suburban hostesses at a golf club, it is obvious that American life is characterized by constant struggle for social predominance that, underneath a veneer of civility, makes the attitude of heart suggestive of the amenities between the big fishes and the little fishes in the sea. This essentially un-Christian spirit invades even what has been called the House of God. Without going to the cynical extreme of saying that churches of to-day are merely social clubs, one must recognize that they are influential social centres and effective instrumentalities for social advancement, as well as organizations for moral betterment and philanthropic work. This unlovely passion, the concomitant of evolution, very appreciably infuses the element of hatred into an institution that should be ruled solely by the law of love.

In speaking of jealousy in a child our language was exonerative of the manifestation of a natural passion. This is not at all inconsistent with moral condemnation of the same

sentiment in persons of sufficient maturity for introspection and self-mastery. In his essay on "Nature" John Stuart Mill says: "The truth is that there is hardly a single point of excellence belonging to human character, which is not decidedly repugnant to the untutored feelings of human nature. . . . Allowing everything to be an instinct which anybody has ever asserted to be one, it remains true that nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct; and that there is hardly anything valuable in the natural man except capacities—a whole world of possibilities, all of them dependent upon eminently artificial discipline for being realized."

All of the so-called "virtues" are artificial products—veracity, respect for other peoples' lives and for the rights of property, monogamy, etc. Rules of conduct, both positive and negative, which gradually have come to be denoted by abstract names and the observance of which has been ingrained in human character, are generalizations of experience of what is for the common good. One of the most instructive examples is furnished by the present sentiment towards gambling. Less than a century ago devout doctors of divinity did not scruple to conduct lotteries for the endowment of enterprises of religion, morality, and education. The practice of gambling has been found so practically demoralizing and disastrous that nowadays private gambling ranks as a vice and public gambling as a crime. The vice of intemperate egoism with its inevitable tendency towards hatred and mental beclouding, the vice which Dryden has not extravagantly termed "the tyrant of the mind," has never received adequate treatment by moralists. It is of course regarded as an unlovely trait and a weakness of character; but, judged by its effect both upon the subject and upon social and public life, jealousy should be taken very seriously, and its indulgence rendered disgraceful in like manner as stealing or lying. This general attitude, of course, could not be produced in a day or by a few sermons; it could, however, be gradually cultivated as has been the view now prevailing towards other sentiments and practices which pass as vicious.

As shallow and false as the saying that love is impossible without jealousy, would be the contention that jealousy could not be uprooted from the average soul without impairing its zeal in the competitions of life. Its extirpation would not dwarf, but would promote the growth of the sturdy virtues. The greatest encouragement for the hope of general reformation is furnished by the substantial number of persons whose disposition renders them exceptions to the prevailing rule. In the humblest and in average walks of life will occasionally be found men and women who sincerely rejoice in others' success. Most frequently non-jealous persons are of neutral and unambitious temperament; sometimes they are gifted with positive traits, and through unusual qualities of heart are capable of generous rivalry. Other men are exempt from jealousy or control jealousy through superior mental endowment. It is a significant fact that of the very greatest men of all time—the men whose greatness was not specialized but many-sided—two, at least, Julius Cæsar and Benjamin Franklin, were notably free from jealousy and its sequent tendency towards resentment and revenge. It is not sufficient or satisfactory to say that such men could not have been jealous because there was nobody worthy of their jealousy. Other men, not as great but still extraordinarily able and clever, have manifested jealousy of the bitterest type; witness Pope's "Dunciad" directed principally against men whom he should only have despised; witness Disraeli's characterization of Gladstone as a declaimer "intoxicated with the exuberance of his own verbosity." The jealousies of great men and able men have been altogether too notorious; but it is believed that jealousy has been subdued by persons of that class oftener and in greater proportion than by men of slender mental equipment. To men of many-sided, broadly philosophical temperament jealousy should appear the most contemptible, because it is the most wantonly inconsequential of vices. To become angry with a man when he has not harmed you, when, on the contrary, he may have befriended and aided you, because nature or fortune has favored him more than you, is Bedlam logic. The

higher in the intellectual scale a man is, the better is his chance of self-conquest over our congenital passion through pure reason. Moreover, instances of generous rivalry are more than ordinarily common among men whose profession is directly that of fighting. The personal relations between opposing military captains and between lawyers are noted not merely for skin-deep courtesy, but for cordial appreciation and even affectionate regard. Their comparative immunity from the bitterness of jealousy is not entirely explainable on the theory of abstract professional loyalty or the absence of the personal equation in the discharge of perfunctory duty. With the military commander there is not only the sentiment of patriotism but the stake of his honor and reputation—his dream of a halo of glory, his whole pride of life. It is erroneous to regard the attitude of advocates at the bar as that of mere soldiers of fortune. To a greater or less degree they personally espouse their clients' causes and feel with them and for them. Men of the bar fight, as it were, hand to hand, and suffer the poignant chagrin of being outwitted by a cleverer, out-manœuvred by a more resourceful foe. Here again the whole pride of life is bound up in winning and continuing to win. Yet in these essentially puissant callings there is a high average degree of magnanimity, not alone towards defeated adversaries, which is not difficult of attainment, but, what is contrary to unregenerate human nature, towards one's own vanquishers. The regeneration which often comes of itself to larger men may be brought about in smaller men—the vast ruck of elbowing, envious humanity—by first evoking sufficient power of introspection to realize that their hearts are sour, and then bringing them to see that their real grievance is against Nature, which, while it implanted in every man the instinct to surpass in so far as in him lies, endowed each man with more ability and less ability than many others.

In the moral education of youth the suppression of jealousy may well be undertaken as systematically as, and only less seriously than, the cultivation of the virtue of veracity which has been pursued for many generations. Jealousy is em-

inently unchristian; to discourage and minimize it is indeed one of the most appropriate tasks which enlightened Christianity could essay. Within the past few years, there has been in this country a deliberate movement to stimulate the emotion of patriotism. School children have been encouraged to uncover before the flag and to kindle with the pride of nationality. While the feature may have been overdone, and sometimes degenerated into mere fetichism, it contains a germ of sound educative policy. In the training of the young the general disposition has been to overlook the vast influence emotionality always will have upon character and conduct, no matter how assiduously the intellect be cultivated. It is part of the legitimate province of the secular—a *fortiori* of the religious teacher to address himself directly to the chastening of emotion, to the inspiring of just feeling. Although the socialist's dream of staying the competitive forces that have made civilization what it is never can be realized, the millennial felicity that Socialism promises might in large measure be attained by deliberately training children for several generations to overcome their congenital tendency to hate as they strive.

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